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Moreover, in view of the timely notice concern, it is suggested
that the Carrick Court could properly have held CPLR 203(e) ap-
plicable in lieu of CPLR 205(a).17 CPLR 203(e) permits an other-
wise untimely claim asserted in an amended pleading to relate
back to claims which were timely asserted in the original plead-
ing. 28 Thus, the use of that section to amend a dismissed wrongful
death action to a preexisting survival action would appear to sat-
isfy the timely notice requirement and not be prejudicial to the
defendant. Such an approach would encourage procedural effi-
ciency by obviating the need to first dismiss an action, and then
reinstitute that action under CPLR 205(a).29
David Don
ARTICLE 3-JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE
OF COURT
CPLR 305(b): Plaintiff's service of bare summons is jurisdictional
defect, but defect is waived by defendant's service of notice of ap-
pearance and demand for complaint
CPLR 305(b) requires that the summons commencing an
supra. Of course, it has been held that proper CPLR 304 service entails fulfillment of CPLR
305(b). See Young v. Franklyn, 93 Misc. 2d 508, 402 N.Y.S.2d 966 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Bronx
County 1978). CPLR 305(b) stipulates that when a complaint is not served with a summons,
the summons must contain a notice of the nature of the claim and the relief sought. CPLR
305(b)(McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). Nevertheless, one court has held that failure to comply
with CPLR 305(b) will not preclude the subsequent use of CPLR 205(a) to reinstitute the
claim. See Limpert v. Garland, 100 Misc. 2d 525, 419 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. Erie County
1979). See also CPLR 305(b) commentary at 96 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); CPLR 3012:1
commentary at 83 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); SIEGEL § 60, at 11 (1979-1980 pam.). Thus,
timely service by summons, without CPLR 305(b) notice, would appear to be the sine qua
non to use of CPLR 205(a).
2 A similar solution was advocated by Judge Meyer in his concurrence in Carrick. See
51 N.Y.2d at 255, 414 N.E.2d at 639, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 137 (Meyer, J., concurring) (citing
Jones v. State, 51 N.Y.2d 943, 952-53, 416 N.E.2d 1050, 1054-55, 435 N.Y.S.2d 715, 719-20
(1980) (Meyer, J., dissenting)). See note 23 and accompanying text supra. See also Caffaro
v. Trayna, 35 N.Y.2d 245, 319 N.E.2d 174, 360 N.Y.S.2d 847 (1974).
21 CPLR 203(e) (1972). See note 18 supra.
29 Although the utilization of CPLR 203(e) in lieu of CPLR 205(a) would be in the
interest of judicial economy, there is scant support for the concept, since the amending-back
provisions of CPLR 203(e) consistently have been held to depend on a valid preexisting
claim. See 51 N.Y.2d at 248, 414 N.E.2d at 635, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 133; Goldberg v. Camp
Mikan-Recro, 42 N.Y.2d 1029, 1030, 369 N.E.2d 8, 8, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1009 (1977)
(mem.); Caffaro v. Trayna, 35 N.Y.2d 245, 250, 319 N.E.2d 174, 176, 360 N.Y.S.2d 847, 850
(1974); Mogavero v. Stony Creek Dev. Corp., 53 App. Div. 2d 1021, 1021, 385 N.Y.S.2d 899,
900 (4th Dep't 1976); note 18 supra.
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action be accompanied by either a complaint or a written notice
detailing the nature of the action and the relief sought.30 As
amended, the statute eliminates the traditional use of the "bare
summons" as a permissible method of commencing an action.3 1 In
30 CPLR 305(b) provides:
If the complaint is not served with the summons, the summons shall contain or
have attached thereto a notice stating the nature of the action and the relief
sought, and, except in an action for medical malpractice, the sum of money for
which judgment may be taken in case of default.
CPLR 305(b) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). It is unclear what degree of specificity is re-
quired when stating the "nature of the action and relief sought" in the 305(b) notice. A
partial description, however, may be deemed inadequate. See Schoonmaker v. Ford Motor
Co., 99 Misc. 2d 1095,418 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1979). In Schoonmaker, the
notice described the nature of the action as one for "wrongful death, conscious pain and
suffering and loss of services" and the relief sought as "monetary damages in the amount of
$10,000,000." Id. at 1095, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 299. The court stated that the notice did not
satisfy the requirements of CPLR 305(b) in that "if a default occurred and judgment was
entered thereon that judgment would be jurisdictionally defective and subject to vacatur."
Id. at 1095, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 289; cf. Arden v. Loew's Hotels Inc., 40 App. Div. 2d 894, 894,
337 N.Y.S.2d 669, 670 (3d Dep't 1972) (statement that "'upon your default, judgment will
be taken against you for the sum of $50,000"' insufficient to satisfy preamendment require-
ment that the "object of the action" be stated). For analysis of the difference between the
former "object of the action" language and the new requirement that the notice state the
"nature of the action," see CPLR 305, commentary at 96-97 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
See generally FwFraNTa ANN. REP. OF TM Jun. CONFERECE ON THz CPLR (1977), in
TWENTY-THIRD ANN. RE'. N.Y. JuD. CoNRzENcE 275-76 (1978) [hereinafter cited as RE-
PORT] (the former language "could be misread as a redundancy denoting merely a require-
ment to specify the type of relief sought in terms of damages or other remedy"). The inclu-
sion within the summons of the CPLR 305(b) notice, described by the draftsmen as a type
of "short form complaint," is a convenient alternative to the more time-consuming process
of drawing up a formal complaint, and allows practitioners to exploit the transitory presence
of the defendant in order to acquire personal jurisdiction. Id. at 275-76.
1 REPORT, supra note 30, at 273. Under prior law, a plaintiff could commence an action
in three ways: through service of a bare summons, through service of a summons accompa-
nied by a complaint, or through service of a summons which included a 305(b) notice detail-
ing the object of the action and the relief sought. Ch. 749 [1974] N.Y. Laws 1783 (CPLR
305(b) prior to 1978 amendments). Practitioners who utilized the bare summons to com-
mence an action were often unaware that, in order to take a default judgment, CPLR
3215(e) requires a plaintiff to file proof that either a CPLR 305(b) notice or complaint was
served with the summons. See CPLR 3215(e) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); REPORT, supra
note 30, at 273. Plaintiffs serving bare summonses, therefore, were unable to take proceed-
ings to enter default judgments, and judgments which had been entered without the requi-
site proof of service were subject to vacatur. McDermott v. Hoenig, 32 App. Div. 2d 838, 302
N.Y.S.2d 280 (2d Dep't 1969). Additionally, pre-CPLR cases indicated that a plaintiff could
not remedy service of a bare summons by later serving the complaint without the defen-
dant's demand. Gluckselig v. H. Michaelyan Inc., 132 Misc. 783, 230 N.Y.S. 593 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1928). See also Ardila v. Roosevelt Hosp., 55 App. Div. 2d 557, 389 N.Y.S.2d
853 (1st Dep't 1976) (plaintiff who serves bare summons under no obligation, for the pur-
pose of avoiding dismissal under CPLR 3012(b), to serve complaint in absence of defen-
dant's demand).
In order to eliminate these difficulties, both CPLR 305(b) and CPLR 3012(b) were
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the wake of the amendment, however, it has been unclear whether
service of a summons without a complaint or a 305(b) notice would
be deemed a jurisdictional defect.3 2 Recently, in Aversano v. Town
of Brookhaven,3 the Appellate Division, Second Department, held
that service of a bare summons does not confer jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant.3 4 The defendant's service of a notice
of appearance and demand for the complaint, however, was held to
waive the defect.35
The plaintiff in Aversano commenced an action by serving a
bare summons shortly before the expiration of the statute of limi-
amended in 1978. See ch. 528, §§ 1, 4 [1978] N.Y. Laws 936. Now a defendant must make a
demand for the complaint within the time specified in CPLR 320(a) for making an appear-
ance, and if no such demand is made, the complaint nevertheless must be served within 20
days of the defendant's service of the notice of appearance. CPLR 3012(b) (McKinney
Supp. 1980-1981). See also CPLR 320(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). The plaintiff's de-
mand for the complaint does not constitute an appearance, but operates to extend the de-
fendant's time to appear until 20 days after the complaint is served. CPLR 3012(b) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1980-1981); 3 WK&M 3012.13 at 30-199; CPLR 3012, commentary at 87
(McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). See generally Homburger and Laufer, Appearance and Ju-
risdictional Motions in New York, 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 374, 393-400 (1965).
32 Compare Limpert v. Garland, 100 Misc. 2d 525, 419 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1979) and Kane v. Erny, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1979, at 16, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County) with Schoonmaker v. Ford Motor Co., 99 Misc. 2d 1095, 418 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup.
Ct. Ulster County 1979). In Limpert, the plaintiff commenced an action by serving a bare
summons. 100 Misc. 2d at 526, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 864. The defendant moved to dismiss, main-
taining that the summons was jurisdictionally defective since it did not contain the requisite
notice setting forth the nature of the action and the relief sought as required by the
amended CPLR 305(b). Id. at 525-26, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 864. The court granted the defen-
dant's motion to dismiss, indicating that the failure to comply with the mandatory notice
provision of CPLR 305(b) is jurisdictional. Id. at 526, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 864. Although the
defendant in Kane had served a notice of appearance and demand for the complaint, the
court nevertheless concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the defendant because service
of the bare summons was improper. N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1979, at 16, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1979). The Schoonmaker court, however, rejected the contention that the failure of
the notice to conform with CPLR 305(b) deprived the court of jurisdiction over the defen-
dant. 99 Misc. 2d at 1096, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 289. In denying the defendant's motion to dis-
miss, the court stated that consideration of the impact of a deficient notice was limited to a
default context. Id.
While courts may differ with respect to whether a bare summons properly commences
an action, the commentators concur in ascribing jurisdictional significance to such service.
Professor Siegel asserts that the draftsmen of the amendment intended the service of a bare
summons to be a jurisdictional defect resulting in dismissal of the plaintiff's action. SlEGEL
§ 69 at 11 (Supp. 1979-1980); CPLR 3012, commentary at 87-88 (McKinney Supp. 1980-
1981). See also 3 WK&M 3012.13 at 30-199. It has been suggested, moreover, that the
plaintiff's only remedy after the defective service would be to recommence the action if the
statute of limitations has not yet expired. Id. (emphasis added).
1- 77 App. Div. 2d 641, 430 N.Y.S.2d 133 (2d Dep't 1980).
:4 Id. at 642, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
5 d.
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tations.36 The defendant then served a notice of appearance and a
demand for the complaint.3 7 After the appropriate limitations
period had expired, the defendant moved to dismiss the action for
lack of jurisdiction.38 Special term, however, denied the motion,
holding that the failure to comply with CPLR 305(b) was jurisdic-
tional only for the purpose of taking a default judgment.3 9
In a memorandum opinion, the Appellate Division, Second
Department, affirmed, holding that the defendant conferred juris-
diction on the court by serving a notice of appearance and demand
for the complaint.40 In reaching its determination, the Aversano
court adopted the rationale of Bal v. Court Employment Project
Inc., 41 a case which involved almost identical facts. 42 In Bal, the
Appellate Division, First Department, indicated that the CPLR
305(b) requirement that the summons be served with either a com-
plaint or appropriate notice serves to ensure that the plaintiff has
the requisite papers for entering a default judgment and to give
the defendant notice of the nature of the action. 43 The Bal court
further observed that a defendant's service of a notice of appear-
ance and demand for the complaint indicates that he has received
notice and intends to appear in the action." The Bal court con-
cluded, therefore, that by serving a notice of appearance and de-
mand for the complaint, the defendant had conferred jurisdiction
on the court and that any defect created by the service of a bare
summons was insufficient to justify dismissal of the action.45
36 Id. The bare summons was served 3 months before the expiration of the appropriate
statute of limitations. Id.
17 Id. at 641, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
38 Id. The defendant moved to dismiss prior to receipt of the complaint. Id. at 642, 430
N.Y.S.2d at 134.
:9 Id. at 641-42, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
0 Id. at 641, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
"1 73 App. Div. 2d 69, 424 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1st Dep't 1980).
42 Compare Aversano v. Town of Brookhaven, 77 App. Div. 2d at 642, 430 N.Y.S.2d at
134 with Bal v. Court Empl. Project Inc., 73 App. Div. 2d at 70-71, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 716-17.
In Bal, the plaintiff commenced an action 3 days before the statute of limitations expired
and 3 days after enactment of the amended CPLR 305(b). 73 App. Div. 2d at 70, 424
N.Y.S.2d at 716. The defendant then served a notice of appearance and demand for the
complaint. Id. Three months later the plaintiff served the complaint and the defendant
moved to dismiss based upon the untimely service. Id. Special term denied the defendant's
motion to dismiss and the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed. Id. at 72, 424
N.Y.S.2d at 717.
"I Id. at 70, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
44 Id. at 71, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 716-17.
45 Id., 424 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
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Although Aversano and Bal appear to indicate that noncom-
pliance with the requirements of CPLR 305(b) is a jurisdictional
defect, neither case adequately addressed the precise nature of the
defect waived. An analysis of the report of the draftsmen of the
amended statute indicates that the change was not intended to
narrow the methods for properly commencing an action, but rather
to alert plaintiffs that compliance with the mandatory notice pro-
visions of CPLR 3215 requires service of either a complaint or a
summons containing the CPLR 305(b) notice.46 Since the express
purpose of the statute is to preserve the ability of unwary plaintiffs
to obtain relief despite a defendant's inaction, it is submitted that
there exists no basis to import an intent to otherwise expand the
jurisdictional significance of failing to comply with CPLR 305(b).47
Moreover, the failure of the legislature to amend CPLR 304, which
apparently continues to sanction the use of a bare summons to
commence an action, further indicates that a narrow interpretation
of the jurisdictional effects of noncompliance is warranted.48 In-
46 CPLR 3215(e) requires that an applicant for a default judgment show proof that a
complaint or adequate 305(b) notice was served with the summons. CPLR 3215(e) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1980-1981). Failure to serve notice or the service of an inadequate notice pre-
cludes entry of a default judgment or may result in the vacation of a judgment. A.J. Ekert
Co. v. George A. Fuller Co., 51 App. Div. 2d 844, 380 N.Y.S.2d 353 (3d Dep't 1976); Arden v.
Loew's Hotels Inc., 40 App. Div. 2d 894, 337 N.Y.S.2d 669 (3d Dep't 1972); McDermott v.
Hoenig, 32 App. Div. 2d 838, 302 N.Y.S.2d 280 (2d Dep't 1969). In McDermott, a default
judgment had been taken against defendants who had been served with a bare summons. 32
App. Div. 2d at 838, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 281. Describing the notice as a "nullity," the court
granted the defendants' motion to vacate based upon the plaintiff's failure to file proof of
service of the summons and complaint or a summons and notice. Id. See generally CPLR
3012, commentary at 87-88 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); SmGEL § 293 at 346-51.
In the Judicial Conference Report the draftsmen of the amended statute state:
The permissive language now contained in CPLR 305(b) ... constitutes a serious
trap for the unwary practitioner who is not familiar with the default provisions of
CPLR 3215(e) governing proof of default ....
Under the proposed amendment the uncertainty now surrounding default
practice under CPLR 305(b) and 3215(c), (e) would be avoided by the mandatory
notice provision.
REPORT, supra note 30 at 275. The draftsmen's preoccupation with the elimination of
"pleading traps" belies the argument that they failed to detail fully the impact of the new
law. Thus it is submitted that they did not intend to alter the established means of com-
mencing an action by rendering a formerly permissible method of service jurisdictional.
47 Id. at 273-77. No specific or implicit reference is made by the draftsmen with respect
to the nature of noncompliance when the entry of a default judgment is not the question
presented. Id.
46 CPLR 304 provides in pertinent part: "An action is commenced and jurisdiction ac-
quired by the service of a summons." CPLR 304 (emphasis added). Cf. CPLR 320(a) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1980-1981)("An appearance shall be made within twenty days after the ser-
vice of the summons .... "). Although existing law should be construed so as to give the
1 SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
deed, the inconsistency between CPLR sections 304 and 305(b)
could operate to mislead an innocent but uninformed plaintiff,
with the resulting noncompliance, if deemed jurisdictional, consti-
tuting a potentially incurable defect.4" Thus, a trap more serious
than the one sought to be eliminated by the amendment would
exist. It is suggested, therefore, that the service of a bare summons
should be deemed commencement of an action and that the juris-
dictional consequences of failure to comply with CPLR 305(b)
should be relegated to consideration only within a default
context.50
Once it is determined that it is jurisdictionally proper to com-
mence an action by service of a bare summons, the question arises
as to the means available to the plaintiff to cure the defect in order
to preserve his right to enter a default judgment. It is suggested
that if the defendant fails to respond when a bare summons is
properly served-thus placing himself in technical default, the
plaintiff should be permitted to move to amend the summons to
include the required notice, pursuant to CPLR 305(c),51 within the
amended CPLR 305(b) its intended effect, it is suggested that the apparent purpose of the
new law-to alert plaintiffs that a bare summons is insufficient to support a default judg-
ment under CPLR 3215-may be effectuated without ascribing jurisdictional consequences
to an attempted commencement with a bare summons.
49 If CPLR 304 is interpreted to incorporate the mandatory notice provisions of CPLR
305(b)-thus making commencement depend upon the service of either a summons with
complaint or a CPLR 305(b) notice-CPLR 205(a) would appear unavailable to permit rein-
stitution of the action in the event of dismissal after the statute of limitations expires. See
Carrick v. Central Gen. Hosp., 51 N.Y.2d 242, 414 N.E.2d 632, 434 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1980). In
Carrick, the Court of Appeals recently stated that "the use of [CPLR 205(a) requires] that a
prior timely action, however flawed, actually was 'commenced' within the meaning of CPLR
304." Id. at 249, 414 N.E.2d at 635, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 134. Indeed, it has been suggested that
noncompliance with 305(b) nullifies the effect of the service for the purposes of 205(a). 3
WK&M 3012.13 at 30-199. But see Limpert v. Garland, 100 Misc. 2d 525, 419 N.Y.S.2d
863 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1979); Kane v. Erny, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1979, at 16, col. 2 (Sup.
Ct. Suffolk County 1979); SEIGEL § 52 at 54. Although both the Kane and Limpert courts
held that the service of a bare summons failed to properly commence an action, thus depriv-
ing the court of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant, they nevertheless granted
permission to recommence pursuant to CPLR 205(a). Limpert v. Garland, 100 Misc. 2d at
326, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 864, Kane v. Erny, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1979, at 16, col. 3. Notably,
neither Limpert nor Kane explained how CPLR 205(a) could be applicable when no prior
action was held to exist.
50 See Schoonmaker v. Ford Motor Co., 99 Misc. 2d 1095, 418 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct.
Ulster County 1979). The Schoonmaker court indicated that although a summons contain-
ing an inadequate CPLR 305(b) notice was jurisdictionally defective, it nevertheless held
that such service properly commences an action when no default occurs. Id., 418 N.Y.S.2d at
289.
" CPLR 305(c) provides in part: "At any time in its discretion ... the court may allow
1981]
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1-year period prescribed for entering a default judgment.52 In order
to avoid the prejudice which might counsel against allowing such
amendment, 53 however, it is submitted that the defendant, upon
receipt of the amended summons, should then have the opportu-
nity to appear and submit responsive pleadings within the time
stated in CPLR 320(a).54 If the defendant moves to dismiss imme-
diately upon the receipt of a bare summons, the plaintiff again
should be permitted to cross move for leave to amend the sum-
mons.5 5 If the plaintiff does not so move and dismissal occurs after
the statute of limitations has expired, he should be permitted to
recommence pursuant to CPLR 205(a).56 Should the defendant re-
spond to the service of a bare summons, as in Bal and Aversano,
by filing a notice of appearance and demand for the complaint, a
waiver of any objection based upon the failure to comply with
CPLR 305(b) should result.57
the summons... to be amended if a substantial right of a party against whom the sum-
mons is issued is not prejudiced." CPLR 305(c) (1972). See also SEIGEL § 64 at 65; 1 WK&M
1 305.14 at 3-173.
'2 See Keyes v. McLaughlin, 49 App. Div. 2d 974, 373 N.Y.S.2d 891 (3d Dep't 1978).
See also SEIGEL § 231 at 280.
5' The amendment of a summons under CPLR 305(c) generally is permitted when the
defect to be corrected is insubstantial or a mere irregularity. Ryan v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 20 App. Div. 2d 270, 247 N.Y.S.2d 243, (4th Dep't 1964); SmIGEL § 64 at 65. If the
statute of limitations has expired, it may be argued that the relation back aspects of CPLR
305(c) operate to prejudice a defendant whose inaction in reliance upon the deficiency of a
bare summons is based on the plaintiff's violation of CPLR 305(b). When a defendant is
timely apprised of the plaintiff's action, however, and is afforded the right to appear and
respond to an amended summons, it is submitted that any potential prejudice of allowing
cure of a CPLR 305(b) defect is significantly reduced.
54 CPLR 320(a) provides that a defendant to whom a summons had been personally
delivered must appear within 20 days. CPLR 320(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). A defen-
dant served other than by personal delivery is given 30 days within which to appear. Id.
5" See note 53 supra. One commentator's interpretation of Bal indicates that a CPLR
305(c) cross motion to amend the summons might be granted. Professor Seigel asserts that
"even if the defendant does not serve a notice of appearance or a demand for the complaint,
but forthwith moves to dismiss the action based on service of a naked summons, dismissal is
not the guaranteed outcome." CPLR 3012, commentary at 81 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
"See Limpert v. Garland, 100 Misc. 2d 525, 419 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. Erie County
1979); Kane v. Erny, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1979, at 16, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1979),
note 49 supra.
'7 Since the CPLR 3215 requisites to entering a default judgment exist to ensure that
the defendant receives adequate notice, A.J. Ekert Co., v. George A. Fuller Co., 51 App. Div.
2d 844, 380 N.Y.S.2d 353 (3d Dep't 1976); Arden v. Loew's Hotels Inc., 40 App. Div. 2d 894,
337 N.Y.S.2d 669 (3d Dep't 1972); McDermott v. Hoenig, 32 App. Div. 2d 838, 302 N.Y.S.2d
280 (2d Dep't 1969), it is submitted that when the defendant requests the notice to which he
is statutorily entitled by serving a notice of appearance and demand for the complaint, he
should not be permitted to complain that the plaintiffs noncompliance with 305(b) pre-
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It is submitted that application of the statute as outlined
above equitably implements the new provision without diluting the
defendant's right to receive notice, and without creating technical
pitfalls designed to frustrate the plaintiff's ability to reach the
merits of a dispute. Since the defendant has received actual timely
notice, it is unlikely that he will be prejudiced if the plaintiff's er-
ror is made remediable.5 8 It is suggested, therefore, that unless the
defendant can demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the plain-
tiff's failure to comply with CPLR 305(b), permission to cure the
defect should be granted freely.59 Finally, since the defendant's in-
action may operate to prolong the dispute without producing any
real benefit under the analysis offered above, it is urged that the
defendant, upon receipt of a bare summons, should file a notice of
appearance and demand for the complaint. If no complaint is re-
ceived within the period prescribed by CPLR 3012(b), a final dis-
missal on the merits may be granted.60
In holding that noncompliance with CPLR 305(b) was waived
cludes the entry of a default judgment.
5" Cf. Stuyvesant v. Weil, 167 N.Y. 421, 60 N.E. 738, (1901) (misnomer of party is
amendable irregularity when defendant is fairly apprised of plaintiff's action); Luce v.
Pierce Muffler Shops, 51 Misc. 2d 256, 272 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Onondaga County 1966) aff'd, 28
App. Div. 2d 826, 282 N.Y.S.2d 724 (4th Dep't 1967) (court acquired jurisdiction over defen-
dant when service of process effected under misnomer apprised defendant of the plaintiff's
action). See also Covino v. Alside Aluminum Supply Co., 42 App. Div. 2d 77, 345 N.Y.S.2d
721 (4th Dep't 1973) ("the policy of permitting mistakes to be corrected at any stage of the
action has always been liberal and from this policy there has been no departure following
the enactment of the CPLR").
5, One commentator has proposed that an appropriate penalty for failure to comply
with CPLR 305(b) may consist in the "assessment of an attorney's fee, payable by the plain-
tiff to the defendant, to cover the cost of the motion. "CPLR 3012, commentary at 81
(McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
,o Under CPLR 3012(b), the defendant's service of a notice of appearance or demand
for the complaint triggers the plaintiffs duty to serve the complaint within 20 days. CPLR
3012(b) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); Bal v. Court Empl. Project Inc., 73 App. Div. 2d at
70, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 716. The court upon motion may dismiss the action if the plaintiff fails
to serve the complaint within the time provided by CPLR 3012(b). Williams v. Howard, 75
App. Div. 2d 894, 428 N.Y.S.2d 54 (2d Dep't 1980); Merchandising Presentation Inc. v. Jack
Blumenfeld, 74 App. Div. 2d 523, 425 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1st Dep't 1980). The absence of an
acceptable excuse for delaying the service of the complaint is determinative. Hellner v.
Mannow, 41 App. Div. 2d 525, 340 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1st Dep't 1973) (per curiam). Notably, at
least one court has characterized the failure to serve a complaint as required by CPLR
3012(b) as a neglect to prosecute within the meaning of CPLR 205(a), thus precluding the
plaintiff from reinstituting the action since the statute of limitations had expired prior to
dismissal. Schwartz v. Luks, 46 App. Div. 2d 634, 359 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1st Dep't 1974)(per
curiam); Wright v. Farlin, 42 App. Div. 2d 141, 346 N.Y.S.2d 11 (3d Dep't), appeal dis-
missed, 33 N.Y.2d 657, 303 N.E.2d 705, 348 N.Y.S. 2d 980 (1973); Fisher v. Tier Oil Co., 75
Misc. 2d 162, 347 N.Y.S.2d 512 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1973).
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by the defendant's service of a notice of appearance and demand
for a complaint, the Aversano decision appears to evidence a trend
toward a liberal construction of the statute.6 ' The precise jurisdic-
tional effect of noncompliance, however, remains uncertain. It is
hoped that future assessment of the consequences of noncompli-
ance will reflect the intentions of the draftsmen and not operate to
peremptorily deprive the plaintiff of his day in court on the merits
of his claim. Until the contours of new legislation are defined, how-
ever, the practitioner is well advised to include either the CPLR
305(b) notice or the complaint with his summons, even if default is
not anticipated.
Carl J. Laurino, Jr.
CPLR 311(1): Validity of service of process upon corporate em-
ployee upheld based on process server's reasonableness and
diligence
Under CPLR 311(1), personal service on a corporation may be
effected by delivery of a summons to a corporate official or an
"agent authorized by appointment" to receive process. In accor-
dance with the statute's purpose of giving the corporation notice of
the commencement of a suit, 3 a liberal trend has developed to ex-
61 Under the CPLR the defendant's service of a notice of appearance generally will not
operate as a waiver of the defendant's objections to personal jurisdiction so long as an objec-
tion to jurisdiction is made in a CPLR 3211(a)(8) motion or in the answer as provided by
CPLR 3211(e). CPLR 320(b).
CPLR 311 (Supp. 1980-1981) provides in pertinent part:
Personal service upon a corporation or governmental subdivision shall be
made by delivering the summons as follows: 1. upon any domestic or foreign cor-
poration, to an officer, director, managing or general agent, or cashier or assistant
cashier or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive ser-
vice ....
CPLR 311(1). The statute consolidated section 229 and parts of section 228 of the CPA and
was based upon rule 4(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. SECOND REP. at 161.
There was no change in substance from the CPA, SECOND RP. at 161, the main thrust of
the legislation b~ing the elimination of the previous distinctions between service of process
in domestic and foreign corporations, id.; see CPLR 311(1), commentary at 254 (1972).
Compare CPA § 228(8)-(9) with CPA § 229(3). Delivery of the summons to the Secretary of
State, under the "agent authorized by ... law" clause of CPLR 311(1), provides another
means of obtaining personal jurisdiction. This is provided for in N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§
306, 307 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1980-1981). See note 84 infra.
63 See, e.g., Fashion Page, Ltd. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 50 N.Y.2d 265, 271-72, 406 N.E.2d
747, 750, 428 N.Y.S.2d 890, 893 (1980). Notice to the corporation was also the purpose of the
predecessors of CPLR 311(1). Barrett v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 138 N.Y. 491, 493, 34
